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NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
1 This book brings together 16 essays on the outside world’s changing perception of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), in the period since Tiananmen and, later, following
the  missile  crisis  in  the  Taiwan  Strait  (1995-1996).  The  essays  are  based  on
contributions  to  a  conference  in  January  2001  in  Hong  Kong ;  thus,  having  been
completed before September 11th 2001, the book might be assumed dated. In fact, it is
not. For while the outbreak of Islamic terrorism and the Iraq War have put into wider
perspective the reality and the imminence of the Chinese threat, this book shows that
some countries, especially those in China’s immediate neighbourhood (such as Japan,
South-East Asia and Russia), will continue to perceive the threat as continuing, even
acute. It also shows that China’s growing power is above all regional and affects much
the other areas of the world, in spite of an increasing influence on the international
energy, raw material and food markets.
2 The contributors to this study (with the exception of Edward Friedman in his chapter
on  Taiwan)  see  the  Chinese  threat  as  more  potential  than  real.  In  fact,  China’s
persistent weaknesses are rightly emphasised : the problems of its state industries, the
fragility of its banking system, the backwardness of its agriculture, the demographic
pressure and the growing social tensions. Even so, as this book shows, a further series
of factors has encouraged the emergence of a “Chinese threat”, that is to say, round
about  1993,  “the  PRC  as  a  rising  power  represents  a  source  of  regional  and
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international instability” (p. 2). Of these factors, Herbert Yee and Ian Storey headline
five : the rapid development of the Chinese economy between 1978 and 1992 (growth
averaging 9.9% per year) ; the authoritarian political system ; China’s growing military
strength accompanied by intensified territorial  disputes  with some neighbours  (the
South  China  Sea)  and  the  confrontation  with  Taiwan ;  conversely,  the  Chinese
government’s fear of a political and economic collapse ; and lastly the rise of Chinese
nationalism and especially of anti-American feeling.
3 On reading various chapters of the book, it seems to be the third and the fifth of those
factors that have most effectively crystallised the concept of a Chinese threat. As Yee
and Storey show in the chapter devoted to Chinese criticism of this idea, it was during
the  missile  crisis  in  the  Taiwan  Strait  that  articles  denouncing  the  existence  of  a
Chinese threat became particularly numerous (p. 22). Similarly, the modernisation of
the  People’s  Liberation  Army,  without  directly  challenging  the  supremacy  of  the
American military,  makes  China “the most  credible  prospective  rival  of  the  United
States in the decades to come”, especially in the two theatres where the two countries
find  themselves  most  closely  engaged,  namely,  the  Korean  Peninsular  and  Taiwan
(Jonathan Pollack). For Japan, the Chinese threat is closely linked to developments in
Taiwan. But, as Wenran Jiang points out, it also has further complexities arising from
the two powers’ rivalry for influence in East Asia, particularly in South-East Asia, and
from Japanese anxieties about whether the People’s Republic might become unstable
from within—a major preoccupation in Tokyo since Tiananmen. As for the countries of
South-East Asia, although all are sensitive to the growing tension in the Taiwan Strait,
their attitude to China has turned out more complex and more ambiguous because of
the presence of significant Chinese communities in most of them (Singapore, Malaysia,
Indonesia,  Thailand and the Philippines) and the territorial  disputes that they have
with Peking in the South China Sea. The case of the Philippines is well set out by Aileen
San Pablo-Baviera ; she outlines China’s strategy of establishing a fait accompli in the
area of the Spratly Islands (Mischief Reef) in 1995 ; and she shows how this encouraged
the  perception  of  a  Chinese  threat.  Vietnam,  despite  its  difficulties  with  China  (as
Carlyle Thayer shows), chose a different strategy, improving its links with Peking while
at the same time diversifying its relations with the rest of the world. But for 2,000 years
its aim has never altered : attempting to contain the oppressive power of its northern
neighbour. Lastly, in the case of India, it is the threat of China’s nuclear weapons that
has justified Delhi’s nuclear ambitions.
4 There are other countries and regions that do not perceive any threat from China. That
is  true not only of  Pakistan,  a long-term ally of  China,  and the Middle East,  where
(according to Yitzhak Shichor) Chinese weapons accounted for no more than 5% of
arms  imports  between  1983  and  1997,  but  also  of  Russia,  where  (Alexander  Lukin
reports) only a minority see Chinese immigration as a threat to the stability of Russia’s
Far East  territories.  Lastly,  in the European Union (as Joachim Glaubitz shows),  the
Chinese threat is perceived as much in terms of human rights and the environment as
of the Taiwan problem.
5 What the various contributions reveal, without always admitting it or clearly setting it
down, are the direct connections, firstly between these varying perceptions and the
Chinese  government’s  foreign policy,  and secondly  between this  foreign policy  and
Peking’s domestic concerns.  After Tiananmen, Peking embarked on an anti-Western
policy  in  order  to  avoid  any  “peaceful  evolution”  towards  democracy.  Then,  the
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collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  forced  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  (CCP)  to  find  a
substitute for the building of socialism. It was then that Deng Xiaoping relaunched the
reforms and promised “wealth and power” to the Chinese people. To mobilise society
behind these aims, the Chinese authorities gave full rein to the nationalism that they
had been repressing during the 1980s and increased their pressure on Taiwan, feigning
the  desire  to  accelerate  the  return  of  the  island  to  China.  At  the  same  time,  they
redoubled their armed forays in the Spratlys. More generally―and this point is missing
from the book—the CCP leadership spread the idea, within Chinese society and also
abroad, that their country could swiftly match up to the world’s leading powers, and
especially the United States, both economically and militarily. In other words, in the
course of the 1990s, China was tempted to put itself on a collision course with America
and its allies, in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere. That is the real origin of the
“Chinese threat” syndrome. 
6 What is more, China is well aware of it. Since George W Bush was elected, and since
September  11th  2001,  Peking  has  sought  by  highly  visible  gestures  to  defuse  this
perception, taking on board (yet without acknowledging it) the advice of some Chinese
academics settled overseas, such as Wu Guoguang and Zheng Yongnian―advice that is
recalled in the book at the end of Chapter 1. Thus, Chinese leaders began to show a
more evident interest in multilateralism, the peaceful resolution of disputes and the
search for a more realistic modus vivendi (that is to say, taking existing alliances into
account) with the United States. That is also the origin of the “Peaceful Rise” theory
enunciated at the end of 2003 by Hu Jintao’s adviser Zheng Bijian but hurriedly put
under wraps (at least until Jiang Zemin’s retirement in September 2004) because of the
divisions it aroused within the communist leadership.
7 So the main reservation that  one might  have about  this  book is  that  it  gives  little
emphasis  to  the  connection between,  on the  one hand,  people’s  perceptions—often
pertinently and precisely analysed—and, on the other, China’s real intentions. While
China’s true aims cannot yet be realised, they do explain in large part the anxieties felt
abroad.  They  are  not  all  military,  except  where  Taiwan  is  concerned.  But  China’s
political  and diplomatic ambitions,  supported by a dynamic economy, are bound to
affect—and,  to  some extent,  destabilise—the surrounding region,  notably Japan,  the
Korean Peninsula and South-East Asia. And one cannot merely bet on the possibility
that, by the time China has assembled the means to encompass its ends, it will have
dropped  its  more  threatening  objectives  thanks  to  the  policy  of  integration  and
engagement  favoured  by  nearly  all  governments.  Most  capitals  in  the  Asia-Pacific
Region look beyond that gamble, playing for a balance between Peking and Washington
that is obviously required to continue.
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